Chapter 4 and Chancey - The perfect Husserlian specimen?

SUMMARY of Chapter 4
Ferrara begins with comparing the basics of Heidegger’s phenomenology with that of his predecessor, Husserl. Heidegger’s incorporation of historical relativism stands as a big differentiation between his theories and that of Husserl. Heidegger disproves the singular act of the transcendental ego rising above preconceptions, instead focusing on finding ones existence in a cultural and historical world before attempting any sophisticated subjectivism. In short, Heidegger’s philosophy is marked by “an interpretation rooted in the analysts historical tradition” (Ferrara 90). This is decidedly different than Husserl and his idea of “pure” descriptions.
Ferrara goes on (in our assigned reading) to explain Heidegger’s work entitled ‘Being and Time.’ He starts where Heidegger starts, a discussion of the question of Being and how it has been lost in Western Philosophy. Then Heidegger’s study of Being, dubbed “fundamental ontology” is explored. The question of Being is tough to define, and many things contribute to Heidegger’s exploration of the state. He narrows this down to the Being of human existence only, and the larger generalization of Being is not discussed in his book or by Ferrara. Heidegger creates a term In order to fully ask the question of Being, man, the questioner, must become “intelligible and comprehensible.” Then Ferrara talks about the importance of Heidegger’s term “da-esin” (literally in German, “Being-There”) and it’s use throughout ‘Being and Time.’ Then the chapter goes on to discuss the etymological roots of phenomenology and relate Heidegger to some of the ancient Greeks.
Eventually Ferrara reaches the crux of the chapter, the discussion of the fundamentals of Hermeneutic Phenomenology, as established by Heidegger. His work helps to establish man’s World as both physical and ontological. “World” is related to Husserl’s Lebenswelt, but it is different. It is the “overall Being of the specific beings of the world” (Ferrara 107). Heidegger’s method is also described as giving the phenomenon the freedom under study to show it’s Being as well. Daesin is explored in full by Ferrara, including Heidegger’s views on death being a completion more than an end, and his views on the future, past and present, and how they relate to his methodology.
REACTION
Reading the chapter is not only enlightening, but certainly reveals the importance of watching a movie entitled “Being There.” Heidegger’s ideas of Being and the never-ending search for completion seems relevant to Chance, who is never searching for anything and somehow finds it. I think Chance represents the ability to transcend one’s own historical perspective and achieve the ultimate elevated analysis of things. Heidegger believes that one must first understand their own limitations before attempting to be critical of anything, but does Chance have any limitations of preconception? According to Heidegger, Chance can’t even get to step one. He can’t recognize his Being because he doesn’t have the ability to understand only man can analyze his own Being and be aware of it. He is neither intelligible nor comprehensive. But perhaps this is the flaw with the intellectual man that Husserl missed, and Heidegger attempted to correct: that man is too intelligent to skip a sense of his own Being before trying to objectively analyze something. Chance has no intellectual barriers, because he has no inelligence. He does understand repetition and patterns, and he can learn to expect things (conditioning, like Louise bringing him lunch). But how much logic is he capable of? Is his experience of life a pure phenomenological experience?